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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ES-},,
TATE OF WILLIAM D. BAXTER,
No. 10216
Deceased.

PROTE:STANTS' AND APPELLr'iNTS' BRIEF

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Utah County, Utah, wherein on July 21, 196-4,
Maurice Harding, one of the Judgeis of said court entered a decree admitting to probate the allege-d Last Will
and Testament of William D. Baxter, deceased.

THE RELIEF S·O,UGHT ON APPEAL
The :protestants and appellants on this appeal se·ek
a reversal of the decre·e admitting the alleged Will of
William D. Baxter to probate.

1
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~STATEMENT

·OF FACTS·

Ruth Baxter, the widow of William D. Baxter, filed
her petition to hav·e .admitted to probate an alleged Last
Will and Testament of William D. Baxter, deceased.
(R 5) The alleged Will is dated April 2·6, 1960, and is
signed by William D·. Baxter and three witne~sses. Above
the signature of the witnesses appears this language:
This instrument was, on the. day and date
hereof signed, published and de-clared by said
testator, William D. Baxter, to :be his Last Will
and Teslament, in the pre·sence of u~s, and at his
request haVie suhseribed our names ther·eto as the
witnesses, in his pre~sence and in the presence of
·each other. At the tim·e of the e~ecution of this
instrument, the ·Said testator ·was of sound and
disposing mind and had a ·clear underistanding of
the nature of th·e instrument being signed and
was not acting under any menac·e or undue influence. ' '
It i~s in ~substance alleged in the petition for the
p:vobate of the alleged Will of ·William D. Baxter that he
died at American Fork, Utah, on June 29, 19·63, and at
the time of his death, he was a r·esident of American
Fork, Utah; that he left :an estate in Utah ·County, Utah,
consi·sting of a -contract of approximately $3,500.00; that
he left a Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is
attached to the Petition; that his heir~s consisted of the
P·etitioner, Ruth Baxter, his wido\v, a son, two granddaughters and a grandson; that one of his sons predecea·sed him; and that the property mentioned in the

2
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·will as being deeded to his son was conveyed to him
prior to the death of the te~stator. ( R 3-4)
One of the granddaughters, Lois Marie Thomas,
filed a protest to the admis,si.on of the will to pro bate.
(R 10-11) Gilbert Baxter, the son, and Ruth Baxter, the
widow of the deeeased, answered the objection of Lois
Thomas to the admission of th~e alleged will to probate.
(R 13-14) On April 20, 19:64, a motion was filed in the
cause by the grandchildren ·objecting to the admission of
the alleged will to probate on the ground that th·e same
was not ·executed in the manner provided by law in that
above the signatures of the witnesses appeared thi~s
language:
''At the time of the ex~ecution of this instrument, the said testator was of sound and disposing mind and had a ·clear understanding of the
nature of the instrument 'being ·sign·ed and was
not acting under any menace or undue influence. ''
(R 19-20)

By leave of the court on April 20, 19,64, the grandchildren of the ·deceased filed amen·ded objections to the
admission of the alleged will to prohate. (R 24) In the
obj·e·ction so filed by the- grandchildren of the dece'dent,
William D. Baxter, it is in substance alleged that th·e
protestants are the grandchildren of William D. Baxter,
deceased; that they are the children of William F. Baxter, who prede-ceased hi~s father, William D. Baxter; that
the alleged L·ast Will of William D. Baxter, deceased,
shows on its face that it is not a v.alid will in that it was
not executed in the manner provided by the provisions

3
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of U·OA, 1953-74-1-5 (4), which provides that there must
he tw.o att~estin·g witnesses, each of whom must sign his
name as a witne~s~s at the end of the Will at the testator's
request, in his presence and in the presence of the other;
that at the end ·of the alleged Will immediately above
the ,signature of the attested witnesses is this language:
''At the time of the execution of this instrument, said testator was of S·Ound and disposing
mind and had a clear understanding of the nature
of the instrument being signed and was not acting
under any menace or undue influence.''
The provisions of U·OA 1953-75-3-9, 75-3-10 and
75-3-11 are quoted in said objections to the admission of
'vill to probate. It is further all~eged that by the provisions .of the law above mentioned the attesting witnesses
are l~mited to signing their names and attesting that they
did ~so .at the request of the testator, that by adding the
language a.s to the eompetency and freedom from menace
and undue influence of Baxter at the time he signed the
alleged will, the attesting witnesses were attempting to
p·erform the functions of the tribunal that may be called
upon to determine such facts. It is also alleged that one
of the witnesses wa~s the physician of the deceased during
his illnes~s and as such wa;s precluded f:r.om t~estifying
because of the provisions of UCA 1953, 78-24-8. That on
or. about June 17th, 1959, said 'Villiam D. Baxter sustained .a ~seve.re heart attack and extensive brain hemorr hagc or stroke, from the ·effects of which he never re·covered and which r·endered him of unsound mind and
·memory; that on A·pril 2·6, 1960, "\vhen he executed the

'4
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allege :dwill, he wa~s incompetent; that Ruth Baxter, the
widow of Jack Burn, and William D. Baxter were married in the month of April, 1958; that at the time of said
marriage, William D. Baxter was the owner of property
in exces~s of $150,000, of which in ~ex·eess of $100,000 was
in cash on deposit in hanks in numerous savings aeeounts,
~some of which money stood in the name of William D.
Baxter and his granddaughter, Edith Grace Hamaker
and s-ome in the name of his granddaughter, Lois Marie
Thomas ; that s-oon after th-e marriage of Ruth Baxter
and William D. Baxter, the said Ruth Baxter began an
attempt to ,secure all of the money which William D.
Baxter had any interest in and after vVilliam D·. Baxter
sustained the brain damage, she incr·eased her efforts to
secure possession of all the money owned by William D.
Baxter or in which he had an interest; that when the
granddaughters or friends of William D. Baxter ~sought
to visit him, his wife, Ruth, ·either resi~sted or dis,suaded
them from making ·such visits or if they did visit him,
the 'said Ruth Baxter -would either answer or otherwise
interfere with any attempt of the friends or relatives to
engage in any ·Conversation with Baxter; "that the said
Ruth Baxter, by menace and undue influence, se·cured
the transfer to her of all the money and certain other
property in which the ,said William D·. Baxter had any
int~erest; that the e'state of William D. Baxter, in addi ..
iion to the property mentioned in the petition of Ruth
Baxter for probate ,of the alleged will of William D.
Baxter has al,so the right to recover money and other

5
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prop·erty which has .be·en unlawfully acquired by the said
Ruth Baxter.''
The protestants prayed judgment that the alleged
will dated April 26, 1960, be declared invalid; that the
petition for the probate ther~eof be denied and that these
protestants be awarded their costs herein. The court
denied the motion to di~smiss the petition for probate of
the will and pursuant to the pl·e.adings above mentioned,
a tr,ia1 was had before the court sitting without a jury
upon the is,sue~s rai~sed by the pleadings. There is a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to the competency of Mr. Baxter at or above the time the alleged will was exe·cuted.
Eight witnesses were -called and testified on behalf of the
prop~on~nts of the will. They were permitted to testify
and did ·testify that on or near April 26, 1960 when the
alleged will wa;s -exeeuted, William D. Baxter was competent. Among the witnesses testifying were Dr. Guy A.
Richards who attended Baxter from the time he .suffered
the ~stroke until he died .an~d Attorney 0. DeVere Wooton,
who acted as attorney for Mr. Baxter and who drew the
alleged will. It was made to appear that DonaldS. Ryder,
the .other ~signer of the will, was in Ca1i£ornia and there.fore not called to testify. (R 9) Ten witnesses were called
by the eont·estants to the admission of the will to probate
who testified that at or near April 26, 1960, when the
alleged will was executed, they were of the opinion that
William D. Baxter was not -competent to ex·ecute a will.
During the course ~o.f the trial, the ~~ourt below held that
the 1protestants did not raise any undue influence that
6
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was practiced upon William D. Baxter and that the only
is~sue rai1se:d by the pleadings was the claim of eo·mp·etency of William D. Baxter. By su·ch a ruling an·d other
rulings made by the trial court, the evidence offered was
limited to its application as to the compet·ency of Mr.
Baxter at the time he ·executed the will. (R 23) There was,
howeer, uncontroverted evidence received without {)lbjection showing that when the friends an·d relatives of
Mr. Baxter call·ed to ~see him, Mrs. Baxter undertook to
interfere with conversations sought to be had with Mr.
Baxter. (R 72-78-104-105) The evid·ence also shows that
Mrs. Baxter 1secured a conveyance to her and Mr. Baxter
a~s joint tenants tw.o tracts of land; that she sold some
stock in an irrigation company (R 103-127); that Mrs.
Baxter secured the transfer to her and Mr. Baxter as
joint tenants numerous bank accoun-ts in the total amount
of $100,000.00. (R 19·5-199') Prior to the time these transfers were made, a number of the accounts stood in the
nameis of Mr. Baxter and his granddaughters as joint
tenants. ;Such transfer's were made without in£orming the
contestants that the accounts were to he taken from the
granddaughters. At the conclusion of the evidence
offered by the proponents of the will, counsel for the
contestants ~stated that they would have .som·e rehuttal
·evidence ·but after a ·conversation had between the court
and -counsel, the court stated that he would take the
matter under advisement. On April 29, 19·64 a motion
for a rehearing was filed upon numerous grounds that
no ruling had been made on the motion to deny the admissi.on of the will to proha.te. (R 35) A hrief was. filed

7
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in_ support ·Of the motion. (R 38-43) On July 21, 1964,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree
was signed and fil~ed. (R 44-46) On August 19, 1964, an
.apipeal was filed with the Clerk of the Q!ourt and on
August 27, 1H64, a D'esignation of Reeord on Appeal was
filed.
ARGUMENT
It is the contention of the appellants that the alleged
will is inva.lid heeause it was not ·executed in the manner
provided by law and that if this oorurt should conclude
otherwise that said trial eourt committed prejudicial
err·or in holding that there was no issue hefore the trial
cO.urt a!S to Mrs. Ruth ·Baxter using undue influence upon
her husband, William D. Baxter.
POINT I
THE TRIAL .. COURT ERRED IN AD·MITTING
TO PRO~BATE THE ALLEGED LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF WILLIAM D. BAXTER, DEc·EASED, BECAU.SE .s.UCH ALLEGED WILL W.AS
NOT WITNE.SSED IN THE MANNER PROVIDED
BYLAW.
U.C.A. 1953, 74-1-5 provide's:
''Every will other than a nuncupative will
must be in writing and every will ·other than an
olographic or nuncupative must be executed and
atterSted as follows :
(1) It must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself;

·8
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(2) The suhs~cription must be made in the
presence of the atte~sting witne~ssHs.
(3) Th·e testator must at the time of subs-cribing the same ~deelare to the attesting witnes,se·s
that the instrument is his will ; and
(4) There must be tw.o :attesting witnesses
each of whom must ~sign hi's name as a witn·ess at
the end of the will at the testator's request, in his
presence, and in the presence of the oth·er.''
II!- the instrument here involved there appears after
the attesting ·paragraph and ahove the ,signature of the
attesting witnesses this language:
"At the· time of the exe-cution of this instrument the said testator was of sound and dis-posing
mind and had a clear understanding of the nature
of the instrument being sign.a:d and was not acting
under any menace or undue influence.'' (R5)
The p.rotestants and appellants contend that the
alleged will was not executed in th·e manner provided by
law, in that, (a) the witnesses did not ·sign th~e same as
pfioi\Tided .by law, and (h) that the witnesses attempted
to perform the function of the ·Court or jury by d·eciding
the very question that :are the functions of the court or
jury that must ·decide the validity of an alleged will
which is being contested.

In our s-omewhat

extende~d ~search

of the authorities
the exact question here raised ~seems to be a matt~er of
first impressi.on in this and other jurisdictions involving
the ·construction of a ~statute similar to that of Utah. We
have been unable to find an adjudicated cas~e or other

9
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authority (except the deei~sion of the trial court in this
·case) which has 'sustained an alleged will which had been
executed in th·e manner that the alleged will here brought
in question was executed. We have also been unable to
find a book of forms which re0ommended execution of a
will in the manner in which the instrument here questioned w:as execute·d.
The authorities as we read them are uniform in
-holding that to he valid a will must be executed in the
manner .provided by law; that the language directing the
manner which a will must :be executed is mandatory. It
is the will of the legislature as expres~sed in its language
that mu:st he given ·e~fect, and not the intention of the
testator..Such is.the holding of this court in the case of
In r£! A.Zexood.er' s Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 Pac. (2d)
402. In that ·case the instrument s·orught to be admitted to
prohate had heen ·signed when the witnesses first saw it,
but the deceased aclmowledged to the witnes,ses that he
had already ;signed the :same. This court by a majority
held that the probate of the instrunl'ent should he denied.
That is the rule generally in construing statutory law
providing for the manner in which a will shall be executed. 94 ·C.J.S. page 965, et seq., Sec. 167. It is there said=

''A will is either valid or invalid as an entirety
as far as execution is ·con.c~ern·ed. All the requirements :stand as of equal importan-ce and must be
observed,. however insignificant they may be in
themHelves, or how·ever meaningless they may be
when considered in relation to the circumstances
of the particular case. Courts are entirely lacking

10
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in powe-r to disp·enHe with any of the requirements
of the ·stature -or to iSUJPply defects in the exeeution
of the will. A failure to ·comply with any one of
the requirements is fatal to the validity of the
will and no defe-ct in its ~exe-cution can be added
or supplied ·by parol proof as di,scussed infer
s.ec. 391. ''
See also 94 ~C.J.S. p·age 967, Sec. 167(e). Numerous cases
are cited in footnotes to the text in sup·port thereof. We
~shall pres-ently direct the attention ·of the ·court to a few
of the cases which are applicable to the facts in this case.
Before doing s·o we call the attention of the court to
the statute .above quoted which requires that a will must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself,
and that each of the attesting witnesses must ~sign his
name as a witness at th·e end of the will.
As to the meaning of the words ''end of the will'' as
applied to the te~sta tor, :Some of the cases S·eem to take
the view that the ·end of the will is the point fartherest
remov.ed from its beginning. The more recent opinions
seem to take the view that the end of the will means at
the point where the testator finishes the disposition of
his property regardles~s of wher-e on the instrument such
provision is >C~;ompleted .. If it is uncertain where on the
instrument the will ends the probate of the will is denied,
be-caus-e not e~e-cuted in the manner provided by law.
The same doctrine is applied to the meaning of the
words ''end of the will'' as applied to the place where
the attesting witn·esses must sign. However, under stat-

11
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ute~s

;such as the Utah statutes the courts hold that the
end of the will means at the end of the attestation because as to the witnesse.s th·e attesting clause is a part of
the will. The following are among the authorities which
support the foregoing statements as to what is meant by
the words "end of the will'' as :applied alike to the testator and the witne~s~s·e~s.

In re Estate of Seama;n, 146 Cal. 45,5, 80 Pa.
700, ad!opted from New York;
In reMora's Estate, 183 ·Cal. 20, 190 P.ac. 168;
In re Mack's Estate, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 89'1,
where numerous eas-e1s are cited;
In re Field's Will, 204 N.Y. 448, 91 N.E. 881;
In re Dunlap's :Will, 87 Cal. 95, 209 Pac. 651;
In re Coyner Estate, 37 Atl(2d) 509;
Jn re Andrew'S' Will, 60 N.Y.C. 441.
In a number of the for·egoing cases a blank space
existed between the end of the will where the te.stator
signed and where the attesting witnesses signed. In most
of such cases it is held that the fact that such a blank
space ·ex~st~ed did not render the will invalid. There i~s a
di,ssenting op.inion in the case of In re Mora's Estate,
supra, which is to the contrary, where a large blank
space exists hetween the end of the will and the attesting
clause signed by th·e witnesses.
The adjudicated cases are agreed that in a statute
such as the Utah ~statute the provision requiring the
testator .and witne.s,ses to sign at the end of the will must

12
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be complied with by both th·e testator and the witnesses.
Such ruling is in accord with the doctrine that in construing a .statute where a particular word is used two or
more times in a statute, the same meaning musJ be given
to the word each time it is •so us·ed. Corey v. Knight, 150
Cal. App. (2d) 671, 680, 319 Pac. {2d) 6.73; LOJW'ton v.
Sw·eitzer, 354 Til. 620, 188 N.·E. 811.
The authorities als·o teach that when the legiJslative
act creates a right and provides the mann·er in which it
shall be eX!ercis-e-d, the right must be exercised in the
manner provided in the act, and not otherwise. N atio~Ml
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D. N R.G. Ry., 44 Utah 26, 34, 13
Pac. ~653; Fletcher v. Paige, 124 Mont. 114,220 P:ac.(2d)
484; Lafayette Tra.n~sfer & St-orage Co. v. Michigan
Pwblic Utilities Com1nission, 287 Mich. 489; 283 NW 659.
It is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-11, that words and
phrases ~shall be ·construed according to the context, and
approved u~sage of the language, etc. Unless technical
terms are used words employed in a ·statute must be
given their usual and ordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co.
v. Central Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 Pac. 862. Other cas·es
ot the same ·effect are collected in a footnote to the above
Act.

Applying the law announced in th·e above cited cases,
and the provisions of the Utah law ahove quoted, the
language at the end of the will means at the point where
the will terminates. Obviou·sly the instrument h·ere
brought in que-stion was ·sign·ed by the te1stator at the
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end thereof. It is equally obvious that the witnes.se:s· did
not ~sign the same at the ·end thereof. But on the contrary,
signed the instrument at the end of a statement unauthorizHd by our law and incompetent as admissable evidence
to establish the facts sought to b~e e'stablished. The witnesses di d not sign at the point directed by U.C.A. 1953,
74-1-5(4), but at the ·end of the statement "At the time
of the execution of this instrument the ~said testator was
of s.ound an~d disposing mind and had a clear understanding of the naure- of the instrument being ·signed and
was not acting under any menace or undue influence.''
1

Ther·e are a number of other prineiples of law which,
when applied to the alleged will of William D. Baxter,
render~s it ¥oid.
By the language just quoted the witnesses seek to
decide the v·ery matter which is the function of the court
or jury. It will be seen that the witnesse~s were not content to expres-s their ~opinion as to the competency and
a·bsene·e of undue influence of Mr. Baxter at the time the
instrument was signed, but sought to relieve whoever
may he called upon to hear and deteTmine those matters
by putting the ~same at rest by their statement. There is
a fundamental distinction between a witness expressing
an opinion as to a fact and in stating as :a fact the ultima:te fact, which in case of a contest must be determined
by the tribunal whog.e duty it is to d·ecide issues raised
by pleadings. In a will contest it is of contro1ling importance whether ·or not the te-stator was competent and not
acting under dure~ss at the time he signed the alleged
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instrument, and the attesting witnesses may not lawfully
decide ·such question ·hut are merely permitted to express
their opinion as to his competency or ahs-enee of undue
influence. Among the Utah cases :so holding are Utah
Copper Co. v. lndu;strial ·Commission, 69 Utah 452, 3 Pac.
397; Roberts v. Salt Lake B & 0 Ry. Co., 5·3 Utah 30, 176
Pac. 855. That is the holding of the caJses generally. 32
C.J.S., p~age 74, Sec. 446, and cases ·cited in footnotes to
the text.
.s.o also the opinion ·of a witnes's as to the comp•ete·ncy
and ahHence of undue influence of an alleged testator is
'his opinion at the time the will is presente-d £or pro hate,
and not his opinion at the time the instrument was signed.
Lyon v. Chicago City R. Co., 250 IlL 75, 101 N.E. 211.
The following· provisions of U.:C.A. 19'53 tend to le-nd
light on the effect ·of adding to the atte,station of the will
the statement of the witnes-ses as to the- competency and
abs·ence of undue influence of Mr. Baxter at the time he
signed the alleged will.
U.C.A. 1953, 78-25-12 provide·s:

"A last will and testament except a nuncupative will is invalid unless it i,s in writing and executed with .such formalities as are required by
law. When therefor -such will is to be ·shown the
instrument its·elf must he produced or secondary
evidence of the contents given.''
U.C.A. 1953, 75-3-8:

''If the will i.s contest·ed all subscribing witnes,ses who are p-resent in the county and who are
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of ~sound mind must be produced and examined,
and the death, ahsence ·or insanity of any of them
mu~st he satisfactory shown.''
U.C.A. 1953, 75-1-·6:

''The provisions of the Code of Civil Proeedure ~shall he applicable to and constitute the
rules of practice in probate and guardianship
proceedings.''
U.C.A. 1953, 75-3-9:

''The testimony of each witness shall he r~e
duced to writing and signed by him and the same
shall ·be evidence in any subsequent ·contest concerning the validity of the will or a suffici~ency of
the proof there-of, if the witness is dead or has
permanently removed from the state.''
U.C.A. 1953, 75-3-10:

''If the c-ourt is ~satisfied upon the proof taken
or from the facts found by the jury, that the will
was :duly exeeuted .and th.at the testator at the
time of its execution was of sound and disposing
mind and n·ot acting under duress, menace, fraud
or undue influence, a certificate of the proof of
the facts found and attested 'by the .Seal of the
·court must he a tta.ch·ed to the will. ''
U ..C.A. 1953, 75-3-11, requires the Clerk to file the
Will, and Certificate of Proof, and the Testimony.

The exe-cution of the alleged will of William D. Bax..
ter ·was not in ·conformity with the provisions of U.C ..A.
1953, 74-1-5(4), in that, the witnes~es di!d not sign at the
end thereof, and theref.o,re is invalid as provided in
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U.'C ..A. 1953, 78-25-12. Not only did the subscribing witnHss~e-s fail to sign at the end of the will as by law required, but ,signed at the end of the competency statement
by which they invade the function of the court or jury
v;rhich may ·be ·called upon to try a contest as to the validity of the al1eged will. T·o hold that the instrument here
involved is a valid will is at war with the provision of
U.C ..A. 1953, 78-25-12.

To approve the witnesses signing the alleged will at
the end of the statement as to the competency, absence of
dure-ss and undue influence in·stea·d of at the ·end of the
will as provided by law offends against the well e,stablished maxim of ''Expression Uniu,s E1st Exclnsio
Alterius. ''
By no stretch of the meaning of the language of
Utah Code Arlfi'lfotated 74-1-5(4), or the rules of statutory
construction may it be ~said that such language permits
the attesting witnes,ses to add before their signatures that
''At the time ·of the execution of this instrument the said
testator was of sound and disposing mind and had a clear
understanding of the nature of the instrument being
signed and was not acting under any menace or undue
influence." The maxim expressio unius e'St ·ex·clusio alterius is a weil ·estabJished rule of construction of this,
and the courts generally. Utah Rapid Transit v. Ogden
City, et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 Pac. (2d) 1; TribUJne Rep·orter
Printing Co. v. H'omer, 51 Utah 153, 157, 169- Pac. 170;
82 C.J.S. page 666, Sec. 333, et deg., where numerous
cas-es from other jurisdictions are cited in footnotes.
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The maxim is espe-cially applicable in the construction of a statut·e. It is well established that when a statute
provides that something be done- and directs the manner
in which it shall he done, it may n01t be done otherwise.
U.tah R1apid Transit Co. v. Ogden, supra, and cases there
cited, and 82 C.J.S. page 666, Sec. 333(a), and case:s cited
in footnotes to the text.
Moreover, to permit a will to be admitted to probate
containing such statements as those by which the witnesses attempted to ·de-cide touching the competency and
freed·om from menace or undue influence .of Baxter is
calculated to involve the ·Court in e-ndless diffi·cnlties. In
a proce·eding had for the admis,sion of a will to prohate
the entire will must be received in evidence. It is in effect
s·o provided in U.C.A. 1953? 75-3-9; 75-3-10 and 74-3-11.
If the case is tried before a jury how may the court lawfully refuse to admit the entire in·strument including the
obj-e-ctional language~ H.ow may the court e.scape the
dilema in which su·ch languag·e has placed it~ If the trial
is being had before a jury how may the court consistently
admit the incompetent statement and then instruct the
jury not to -consider the same, and expect the jury to
un,derstand and follow such an inistruction ~ If the case
is tried hefore the court sitting without a jury involving
a will containing such incompetent statements, and the
c.ourt concludes that such incompetent .statements are
proper in a will, how may the court conclude that such
statements did not ·enter into his conclusion that the will
was propeTly exe·cuted?
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Not only is the language immediately preceding the
signatures of the attHsting witnesses incomp·etent as evidence and is not authorized by law, hut if given effect
would offend against the provisions of Section 7 of
Article One of the Constitwtion of Utah that no person
shall he deprived of life, liberty or pr.o.perty without due
pr.ocess of law.'' This ·court has had a number of occasions to pass upon ·cir·cum,stances in which that constitutionaJ provision is applicable ..See U.C.A. Vol. 1, page 14.
Among .such ·cases is Christianson v. Harris, 109 Utah 1,
116 P.ac.(2d) 314, where it is held that due process of law
requires parties to litigation shall have an opportunity to
examine and ·Cr·os~s ·examine witnesses. Oth·er state and
federal ·cases so holding are ·colle-cted in 16A C.J.S. page
824, note 54.18. If the vali·dity of a will offered for probate may be ~shown_ by such spurious ·statements as those
here brought in question when one or more of the attestin~ witnesa.es is absent from the 0ounty where the
will is offered for prohate or i.s dead or insane, obviously
the contesting heirs are deprive-d of their constitutional
right of examination and cross-examination.
The attention of the court is again called to the pr.ovisions of U.C.A. 1953, 75-3-8 and 75-3-9, which require
that in the event of a ·contest a1l~subserihing witne·sses to
a will who are pres·ent in the county must be called, and
if any of such witnesse1s .are not ipresent in the county or
who are dead or insane, ·such fact must be ·shown and
'
that the testimony of the witne:sse·s must he redu~ced to
writing and signed by him, and when so signed ~shall he
.
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evidence of the validity of the will in any subsequent
contest.
It is ·Common knovYledge that as a general rul·e persons who are the heirs ·of a te-stator are not present when
a will is being executed, and if ·statements ·such as tho:Se
here being attacked are to be admitted in ·evidence, it
may well be that the heirs of a deceased person will be
deprived of their interest in the de-cedent's estate by
evidence of controlling importarnce without G!Yb opporturnity to cross examine the atteiSting witness·es. Indeed
that is \V hat occurred as to one of the attesting wi tne-s.ses
in this ·ease who was not present in the county where the
alleged will was offered for iprobate. Under the doctrine
contended for by the propon·ents of a vvill, if none o.f the
attesting vvitnesses are present in the county, or are
dead or insane at the time a will is off.ered for pro:bate,
the -competency and freedom from undue influence could
doubtle~ss be ·established by such statements as those contained in the .alleged will of Baxter. If that is permissible,
!Obviously the heirs of a de·cedent who would inherit his
property .are de,prived of their rights without due process
of law.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ·COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERRO·R IN HOLDING THAT NO ISSUE WAS
RAIRED BY THE PLEADINtG _!\S TO RlTTH BAXTER., THE WID!OW, USIN·G Ul'JDUE INFLU·ENC'E
TO SECURE THE TRAN.SFER TO HER AND· MR.
BAXTER AS JOINT TENANT·S OF T"\\"'"0 TRACTS
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OF REAL ESTATE AND NUMERO·U·S BANK ACCOUNTS WHI,CH HAD THERETOFORE ·ST·OOD IN
THE NAME ·OF MR. BAXTER AND HIS GRANDDAU~GHTERS.

Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that there are a number of matters that may he set
forth in an affirmative answer to the complaint, among
which are duress and illegality. ,Subdivision 8 (e) pr.ovides that ·each .averment of a pleading shall be simple,
conci,se and 'direct, 8 (1) provides that no technical forms
of .p1eaqings or motions are required. Section 1 (f) provides that all pleadings shall be so ·Construed as to do
substantial justice. There is nothing in the Rule's requiring a more definite statement when the claim is that the
instrument involv·ed is illegal. If the proponents of the
will·claim that the ansrwer of the c.ontestants was vague
or ambiguous, the remedy is hy a motion for a more
definite ~statement under Rule 12 (e). However, it is
doubtful if the proponents of the will would have been
entitled to a more definite .statement. Duress and undue
influence is generally practiced in secret, and protestan ts,
the·refore, must rely in great part upon circumstantiai
evidence to ·support the ·claim that the will is invali·d because its execut1on was ·Se·cured by unlawful means. If,
as is alleged in the objection to the a;dmission of th·e will
to prob.ate, Willialn D. Baxter had property in excess of
$1'50,000.00, of which $100,000.00 was in the form of cash
on deposit in hanks, some of which stood in the name of
William D. Baxter and his granddaughters, it would
seem to follow that the e,stahlishment of ·such f:act as to
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securing the conveyance of the property actually conv·e~Ted, but also that "rhich is provided to be conveyed
by the terms of the will. Not only are such allegations
sufficient to raise an iStsue of undue influence in exe·cution of the "rill hut also raises an issue under Rule 13 of
Utah Rules of ·Civil Procedure. !{oreover, elements
touching the alleged menace and undue influence was
properly .admissible as bearing upon the appointment of
Ruth Baxter as exe-cutrix of the will as provided in UOA
1953, 75-3-15, by 'vhich the integrity of a person who
seeks to he appointed exeeu trix is a proper subject of
inquiry. If it should he established that Ruth Baxter was
guilty of the actions ·charged in the objections, the will
should not have been admitted to probate and even if it
should, it wa!s error to appoint Ruth Baxter as such
E:~xecutrix if she was guilty of the acts alleged in the
objections.
The trial ·Court refused to allow the protestants to
introduce any evidence of undue influence or duress,
claiming it was not pleaded. The mere filing of obj·ections
(see 75-3-7 UCA 1953) puts this fact in issue f.or the court
mu·st affirmatively find "the testator at the time of its
exe-cution was ,of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, m·enace, fraud or undue influence (see
75-3-10 UCA) and signed such certifieate of proof."

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERREJ) IN 0\TERRULING
THE O·BJEC'TTONS ON THE AD1\1:IS.SION OF THE

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF 0. DeVERE WO·O·TON,
WHEN MR. WOOT·O·N WAS RECALLED TO TESTIFY AS TO CONVERSATION.S HAD WITH THE
DECEASED, WILLIAM D. BAXTER, AFTER THE
ALLE·GED WILL WAS EXECUTED. (Tr. 170-179)
We .ar·e mindful that it is the s-ettled law that an
attorney who prepares a will may te-stify as to conversations had with the testator concerning facts connected
with the exe·cution of a will. It is so held by this court in
the ·cas-e o.f In Re Young Estate, 33 Utah 384, 94 Pac. 731.
How·ever, in the main, the testimony given in rebuttal by
Attorney Wooton is ·directed to ·conversations had with
Mr. Baxter after the alleged will was ex·ecute-d and is
directed to statements made by Mr. Baxter as to his
reasons for not wanting his grandchildr·en, esp·ecially
his granddaughters, to receive any of his property. If
a testator desires to change his will, he may d.o so by
either making a new fill or by executing a codicil. It may
not be done by ·conversations had with hi·s attoTney.
Moreover, if the testimony given in rebuttal was to sho~
that the deceased intended to e·~clude his grandchildren
fr.om participating in hi~s estate as provided in UCA
1953, 74-1-32, such testimony was not proiperly admissable in this pr.oce·eding. But if adrnissa·ble at all, it
would be upon the final distribution of the property
mentioned in the will, In R.e Froodsen.'s Will, 50 Utah
15·6, 16·6; 167 P.ac. 3:62.

WHEREFORE, the appellants pray judgment that
the decree 8Appealed fr-om he reversed; that the alleged
will of William D. Baxter be- de·clared invalid and if th.at

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

may not be done that the eourt below be directed to grant
a new trial to oorrect the ·errors claim·ed by appellants.
Respectfully submitt·ed,

HEBER GRANT IVINS
75 North Center Street
American Fork, Utah
CLARENCE M. BECK
and

ELIA.S HAN.SEN
Felt Building
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
Attorneys for Protestants a;nd
Appellants to Admission of
Will to Probate
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